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Abstract  
 
 
Being one of the most widely studied anomalies, the Accruals Anomaly, firstly 
documented by Sloan (1996), is the negative relation between accounting accruals and 
future stock returns.  
Trying to overcome some gaps in the literature, we study the relationship between 
managers and investor’s behavior and the evolution of stock markets to understand their 
different contribution to the anomaly in the first place. It is our objective to understand if 
such close markets as Portugal and Spain behave differently in a way that contributes to 
the (non)existence of this anomaly and to recognize if both managers and investors play an 
active role in Accruals Anomaly. 
The study was conducted by collecting a year-sample of both Portuguese and Spanish 
public companies, in the two different periods – before and during the financial crisis.  
We show that 1) there is a negative relation between accruals and future returns, but only 
in Portugal; 2) it is possible to exploit the anomaly in Portugal and yield abnormal returns 
(20,4% in first year); 3) the financial crisis impacted negatively the returns achieved by 
Portuguese investors; 4) the overall results are consistent with earnings manipulation in 
Portugal and to lower income predictability in Spain due to an inflexible accounting 
system to record accruals.  
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Sumário Executivo 
 
 
Sendo uma das anomalias mais amplamente estudadas, a Anomalia dos Accruals, 
documentada pela primeira vez por Sloan (1996), estabelece a relação negativa entre 
accruals e retornos futuros. 
De forma a superar algumas falhas na literatura, decidímos estudar a relação entre o 
comportamento de gestores e investidores e a evolução nos mercados financeiros para 
perceber as suas diferentes contribuições para a anomalia. É nosso objetivo compreender 
se mercados tão próximos se comportam tão diferentemente ao ponto de contribuir para a 
(não)existência da anomalia e ao mesmo tempo reconhecer se os gestores e investidores 
desempenham um papel ativo  na Anomalia dos Accruals. 
O estudo foi realizado através da recolha de uma amostra de dados anuais em empresas 
públicas portuguesas e espanholas, em dois períodos diferentes - antes e durante a crise 
financeira. 
Mostramos que 1) existe uma relação negativa entre accruals e retornos futuros, mas 
apenas em Portugal; 2) é possível explorar a anomalia em Portugal e produzir retornos 
anormais (20,4% no primeiro ano); 3) o impacto da crise financeira afetou negativamente 
os rendimentos obtidos por investidores portugueses; 4) os resultados, na generalidade, são 
consistentes com manipulação de resultados em Portugal e com baixa previsibilidade dos 
resultados em Espanha devido a um sistema de contabilidade inflexível para o registo de 
accruals. 
Key-words: Acréscimos, Anomalia, Cash flows, Resultados, Eficiência de Mercado 
 
JEL-Codes: G14, D53, M12, M41 
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1. Introduction  
 
The accounting statements disclosed by companies are the major source of information for 
investors when trying to figure out where to invest. Therefore, understanding financial 
statements and the story that they told us is a major imperative. By comprehending the 
relationship between the earnings released and the profitability of stocks, investors can 
profit from taking the best decisions. However, it is important to notice that, sometimes, 
decisions based on earnings can be biased either because of manager’s earnings 
manipulation or because investors fail to identify the different persistence in earnings 
components. The anomaly plays, therefore, an important role in the literature. 
The accruals anomaly is the negative relation between accounting accruals – the non-cash 
component of earnings – and future stock returns. The literature supports that earnings that 
have a higher (lower) component of accruals when comparing to operating cashflows tend 
to poorly (wealthy) perform in the future. So, it is really important to understand if 
company’s earnings are based on real cash inflows or if they are based in revenue 
appreciation from managers’ questionable accounting practices. Firms that register a high 
(low) level of accruals have less (more) certain earnings and consequently should earn 
lower (higher) market returns. 
Although Vale (2013) found evidence of the anomaly in Portugal and Papanastasopoulos 
(2013) in European Equity Markets, the questions and conclusions that their work raised 
are very different from the ones that we formulated. So, this particular study assumes great 
importance when we try to understand if such close markets behave differently in a way 
that contribute to the (non) existence of this anomaly. 
Richard G. Sloan was the first to introduce the anomaly, in 1996. The author, in his paper, 
refers that the market participants over-weight the accrual component of earnings and 
consequently, under-weight the cash flow component when setting prices. Thus, the 
market fails to incorporate the different persistence associated to those two components 
showing that investors and market participants fixate on earnings when analyzing financial 
statements and companies’ earnings – the Accruals Anomaly was born. 
Sloan (1996) goes even further and mentions that this accruals anomaly is the responsible 
for the market misprices firms allowing the implementation of strategies that get abnormal 
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returns: the market forecast higher (lower) future earnings from continuous operations to 
firms with higher (lower) levels of accruals. 
This topic has been very controversial, dividing the scientific community, either because 
some authors affirms that the anomaly exists and will persist in time and others do not; 
either because there are no consensus in the literature regarding the causes of the anomaly. 
As it was mentioned before, Sloan (1996) raised for the first time the Earnings Fixation 
Hypothesis to explain the anomaly. Others (Hribar, 2000; Xie, 2001; Thomas and Zhang, 
2002; Chan et al., 2006) point the Earnings Management Hypothesis as the main cause to 
the problem, justifying the anomaly with the manipulation of the discretionary part of the 
accrual’s component by managers. The bad quality of the earnings, the aggregation of the 
earnings’ components and even the human behavior of analysts appear in the literature as 
causes of the anomaly.  
The main aim, with this study, beyond examine if the anomaly is present in Portugal and 
Spain is to analyze the different agent’s – investors and managers – contribution to the 
anomaly. By studying investors, we will try to understand if they are rational when 
evaluating earnings and if they can distinguish earnings components and their different 
levels of persistence. By studying managers, we will try to assess if earnings management 
has an important role in the anomaly by trying to perceive if they manipulate a particular 
component of accruals – the discretionary accruals.  
The adoption of two different periods – before and during the financial crisis – will allow 
us to understand if the financial crisis is, somehow, responsible to spread or mitigate the 
anomaly. It is also an objective, by analyzing such different markets, to understand what 
may be the reasons that explain the appearance of the anomaly in the first place. 
The study would not be completed without exploiting the anomaly and trying to 
understand whether there is any particular strategy that can produce abnormal returns. 
As it was mentioned before, this research approaches both the investors and managers side. 
To study investors, we will start by calculating the firms’ accruals since the ones that 
appear in the balance sheet can contain errors according to Collins and Hribar (2000). With 
this information, we will be able to aggregate the data by ranking firms by accruals into 
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equally weighted quartiles
1
 and test a strategy to exploit the anomaly. A size adjustment to 
the returns will be employed to understand if the combination of a long position in the 
lowest accrual portfolio and a short position in the highest accrual portfolio yields, in fact, 
abnormal returns for investors. To study managers, we will use the Modified Jones Model 
proposed by Dechow et al. (1995) to calculate both component of accruals – normal and 
abnormal accruals – and we will analyze the latter to try to infer about earnings 
manipulation.   
Our study show that 1) there is a negative relation between accruals and future returns, but 
only in Portugal; 2) it is possible to exploit the anomaly in Portugal and yield abnormal 
returns; 3) the financial crisis impact negatively the returns achieved by Portuguese 
investors; 4) the overall results are consistent with earnings manipulation in Portugal and 
to lower income predictability in Spain due to an inflexible accounting system to record 
accruals.  
Besides this section, this dissertation is structured as follows: in Section 2, a literature 
review of the topic will be made. Formerly, the section 3 will be reserved to the hypothesis 
formulation where we will try to address the key points of this study. To be able to test 
those premises, we will define, in section 4, our sample and the methodology that we will 
adopt to conduct this study and in section 5 we will present our results. This research ends 
with a summary of the main conclusions that the research will allow us to achieve.    
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Sloan (1996) ranked the data into deciles but since our sample is relatively smaller, we decide to divide the 
portfolios in quartiles. 
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2. Review of Literature 
Trying to understand the Accruals Anomaly and what may motivate its appearance has 
been a challenge for researches studying this topic over the ages, seeking for a better 
explanation, a better strategy, a better understanding for the problem. So, in this section, 
we will address main conclusions and theories suggested by the authors in past years.  
Firstly, we will make a brief review of accruals definitions suggested by several 
researchers and in section 2.2 we will go deep in the subject and we will analyze both 
accruals components – discretionary and non-discretionary accruals. As the causes for the 
anomaly are a controversial topic in the literature, in section 2.3 we will enumerate the 
most defended sources to justify the appearance of the anomaly in first place. 
 
2.1 A Broader Definition of Accruals  
Accrual is an accounting term used to represent liabilities and non-cash assets as accounts 
payable, accounts receivable, goodwill, tax liabilities and interest expenses. Before the 
appearance of this rubric, the balance sheet was only able to record cash transactions, 
blocking investors to assess the real history of the company. 
Healy (1985) and Sloan (1996) have been considered, for many, the accounting economics 
pillars in literature since their definitions
2
 and models opposed, for the first time, accruals 
and cash flows.  
Prior to Sloan (1996), many authors explored and tried to understand the relationship 
between earnings growth and stock prices. However, Sloan receives the credit for being the 
first author to separate earnings into its two components – Cash Flows and Accruals – and 
in their different nature in predicting future returns. The companies’ earnings with a great 
portion of cash flows when comparing to accruals outperform those in the opposite 
situation. 
To conduct his study, Sloan (1996) follows the definition of accruals used by Dechow et 
al. (1995) which was grounded in the work of Healy (1985) and Jones (1991). Essentially, 
this definition of accruals is focused on the change in current net operating assets, being 
                                                 
2
 However, it is important to detach that the accruals’ definition of Healy (1985) excludes several significant 
variables as non-current operating asset accruals. 
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the difference between earnings and accruals, the cash flow component of earnings. 
Other authors, namely Richardson et al. (2005), decided to expand the accruals’ definition. 
Differently from Healy (1985) and Sloan (1996), they include in their definition accruals 
related with non-current operating assets (namely capital expenditures), accruals related to 
non-current operating liabilities (as post-retirement benefit obligations), accruals related to 
financial assets (like long-term receivables) and also accruals related to financial liabilities 
(such as long-term debt). 
The way we compute accruals is truly important since it will affect our outcomes and the 
conclusions of our study. 
Sloan along with Richardson et al. (2005) found that by rating each accrual according to its 
accounting reliability, “less reliable accruals lead to lower earnings persistence” 
(Richardson et al., 2005, p. 438). They also add that “investors do not fully anticipate the 
lower earnings persistence, leading to significant security mispricing” (Richardson et al., 
2005, pp. 437-438). The authors refer that the persistence of earnings and the mispricing 
are directly related with the reliability of the correspondent accruals. Consequently, they 
developed a more comprehensive definition of accruals showing that the mispricing is 
even greater. The anomaly is detected even when the earnings components are less 
reliable, namely financial accruals, extraordinary charges. In fact, when building their 
hedge strategy and consequently their hedge portfolios, they obtained different results from 
Sloan (1996). For the change in non-cash net operating assets, the hedge returns were 
about 18% per year. On the other hand, by using Sloan’s original definition – that only 
includes the change in current net operating assets – the return observed is quite below – 
13,3%. The stronger returns obtained by Richardson et al. (2005) can be effortlessly 
explained by this broader definition including accountants’ estimates of future long term 
benefits. If we analyze Sloan’s definition, we notice that the long term accruals are not 
incorporated and therefore, do not provide a complete measure of this variable. The results 
that the authors achieved supported the efficacy of the broader measure of accruals. 
Hribar and Collins (2002), following the work of Sloan (1996), compared the results 
obtained by deriving the total accruals from the cash flow statement with the definition 
used by Sloan (1996). By conducting this study, they were able to discover that the 
mispricing is higher when using the Cash Flow Statement approach. They justify the result 
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by stating that when a firm is part from a takeover, the consolidation to the acquirer’s 
financial statements leads to errors. 
When calculating accruals, Hirshleifer et al. (2004) advise us to improve the Sloan 
(1996)’s model by incorporating accruals of past years. Recall that Sloan (1996) only 
considers accruals made over the past year. The authors defended that aggregating accruals 
over the entire life of the firm should produce a better measure of earnings quality and 
claim to provide supporting evidence. This particular question does not seem linear and 
consensual among literature. Richardson et al. (2005) cast doubt on the interpretation of 
the evidence in Hirshleifer et al. (2004). 
 
2.2. Discretionary and Non-Discretionary Accruals 
Dissecting the accrual rubric, there are two components that were also object of study by 
many authors – the discretionary and non-discretionary accruals. 
Starting by the estimation of the discretionary accruals, Balsam et al. (2002), Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) among others developed several techniques that opposed the actual accrual 
with the accrual predicted by a model, using regressions of earning growth in different 
asset types. The Jones Model, developed by Jones (1991) and the Modified Jones Model, 
proposed by Dechow et al. (1995), are most used to compute the discretionary accruals. 
Xie (2001), opposing theoretical accruals calculated by the Jones (1991) model to real 
accruals priced by the market, concluded that the market overprices abnormal accruals 
relative to their one-year-ahead earnings. Moreover, in his research, Xie (2001) also found 
that investors fail to categorize the discretionary and non-discretionary components of 
accruals. Consequently, they fail to identify that the first is less persistence than the latter. 
Richardson et al. (2005) also conduct a study to try to understand the relation between high 
accruals firms and earnings manipulation. With this study they discover that high accrual 
firms are more plausible to be punished by SEC for overstating earnings. Still analyzing 
the topic of SEC enforcement action, Dechow et al. (2011a) with a wide-ranging sample 
reach the same conclusions. So, we can infer that when searching for earnings 
manipulation we should expect to find firms with high levels of accruals, namely regarding 
accounts receivables and inventory. 
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Nevertheless, it is really important to detach that is very difficult to disaggregate this two 
accruals components since in financial statements this separation is not compulsory. 
However, the anomaly appears to be stronger for discretionary accruals. 
 
2.3 Causes of the Anomaly 
Numerous authors, through the years, explored this topic trying to justify the existence of 
the anomaly by several factors. However, this subject is not consensual in the literature.  
In this section, we will review the causes that appear to be the most supported by the 
scientific community to explain this phenomenon. 
 
2.3.1 The Earnings Fixation Hypothesis 
Sloan (1996) defended the Earnings Fixation Hypothesis (EFH) as the main cause for the 
anomaly. According to this theory, the investors fixate upon earnings and fail to separate 
the cash flow and accrual components of earnings. The investors need to be aware of the 
different forecasts that each component can induce. In fact, the author proved that investors 
become overly optimistic about the future of firms with high accruals and overly 
pessimistic regarding firms with low accruals. Thus, since the investors look at the 
information in a poorly way, stocks will be traded in a biased way: the high (low) accrual 
companies become overvalued (undervalued) and subsequently produce low (high) 
abnormal returns. 
 
2.3.2 The Different Accruals Components 
Bradshaw et al. (2001) refer that the accruals anomaly is mainly driven by working capital 
accruals. On the other hand, Thomas and Zhang (2002) defend that the inventory changes 
are the component of accruals that dominate all the others, meaning that the accrual’s 
anomaly is strongest for inventory accruals. In their research, they found that the negative 
relation that Sloan (1996) documented between accruals and abnormal returns is mainly 
driven by inventory changes
3
. In a total of 28 years studied, the hedge returns for changes 
                                                 
3
 According to the authors, if a firm verifies an increase in demand/profitability, future estimations will 
predict an increase in demand as well. However, if for some reason the actual demand is lower than the 
expected, the inventory increases due to this discrepancy between sales and purchases. So, these shifts in 
demand are associated with profitability reversals. According to the authors, if a firm verifies an increase in 
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in inventories were positive in 27. The same conclusions were also reached by Chan et al. 
(2006) that justify by stating that the managers are very reticent to write-down inventories 
when the demand does not matches the expectations. The same results are supported by 
Allen et al. (2013). They show in their research that extreme inventory accruals are 
particularly likely to experience extreme subsequent reversals. 
Also the Mishkin (1983)’s test allowed Xie (2001) to get the conclusion that the abnormal 
returns are mainly explained by this component. In fact, market assume a higher 
persistence of inventory changes than it actually should because investors believe that 
changes in inventories in year t will also be confirmed in year t+1, which does not 
necessarily holds. 
 
2.3.3 The Earnings Management Hypothesis 
The earnings management has been pointed by many as the main trigger of the accrual’s 
anomaly. Dechow et al. (1995) evaluated alternative accrual-based models for detecting 
earnings management and they rejected the hypothesis of no earnings management in firms 
with extreme financial performance. Moreover, they also defended that when measuring 
firm performance we should consider both earnings and cash from operations performance, 
otherwise the tests could be misleader and misspecified. 
Xie (2001), as it was already mentioned before, investigated a particular component of 
accruals – the discretionary accruals. According to this author, this component reflects 
managerial earnings manipulation. So, he decided to explore “whether the market 
rationally prices abnormal accruals with respect to their one-year-ahead earnings 
implications” (Xie, 2001, p. 358). To conduct his study, Xie (2001) used the Jones Model 
(1991) to decompose firm-level accruals into normal accruals and discretionary accruals
4
. 
The author discovered that abnormal accruals are less persistent than normal accruals. In 
fact, the Mishkin (1983)’s test results showed that the market overprice both discretionary 
and normal accruals. However, the Hedge Portfolio Test doesn´t sustain the overpricing of 
                                                                                                                                                    
demand/profitability, future estimations will predict an increase in demand as well. However, if for some 
reason the actual demand is lower than the expected, the inventory increases due to this discrepancy between 
sales and purchases. So, these shifts in demand are associated with profitability reversals. 
4
 Normal accruals are considered to be the accrual component that is expressed by the changes in sales 
revenues and investment expenditure, reflecting this way business conditions. Consequently, the abnormal 
accrual is the remain part and can be seen as the accruals’ portion that can be manipulated by the managers 
(discretionary accrual). 
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normal accruals. Both tests indicate the overpricing of abnormal accruals as “more severe”, 
with this mispricing only occurring because of market’s inability to correctly assess the 
persistence of such accrual component. Is that lack of settings and tools that opens door to 
managers manipulate earnings, like in Initial Public Offerings or Seasonal Equity 
Offerings. 
Beneish and Vargus (2002) also studied earnings manipulation and the impact of insider 
trading on earnings quality and in accrual’s valuation. In their work, they evaluated 
whether a signal based on insider trading can somehow predict one-year-ahead earnings 
persistence and consequently help identify firms with high and low earnings quality, with 
earnings quality being the capability of a firm sustain their income in the future. Following 
Sloan’s techniques, they also tested, by examining the market, if the accruals pricing in the 
firms with higher and lower earnings quality is different and, if so, if the low earnings 
quality earnings are associated with earnings management. From their research, they 
conclude that if managers expect the earnings to persist, they have an incentive to purchase 
their own firm stock. Prior authors mention that this “buy” happens before the stock prices 
increase and investors can see that insider buying as a positive signal of earnings quality. 
However, what may in fact could be happening is that managers keep to themselves 
information related “to the effect of income-increasing accruals on their firm’s prospectus 
either to strategically increase their stake in the firms’ equity or to abstain from selling” 
(Beneish and Vargus, 2002, p.758). The rationale behind it is quite simple: if managers 
manipulate earnings to cover bad performance by income-increasing accruals, it is logical 
that as they are aware of the poorly future performance, they sell their stock. 
What the authors conclude was that “income-increasing accruals are significantly more 
persistent for firms with abnormal insider buying and significantly less persistent for firms 
with abnormal insider selling, relative to firms for which there is no abnormal insider 
trading” (Beneish and Vargus, 2002, p.756).. Moreover, they also stated that insider 
trading information is particular useful a priori to identify if income-increasing accruals’ 
quality is high or low. To summarize, the authors gave us important insights in their work. 
Firstly, they found evidence that the mispricing in the accruals can be mainly attributable 
to the mispricing of income-increasing accruals. Secondly, they discovered that income-
increasing accruals tend to be overpriced when managers adopt the strategy of abnormal 
selling and well-priced when managers take part in an abnormal buying. Thirdly, market 
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participants tend to “overprice income-increasing accruals when firm’s top executives do 
not trade, but the overpricing is less severe than when managers engage in abnormal 
selling” (Beneish and Vargus, 2002, pp. 756-757). Fourthly and finally, market 
participants tend to price and look to all increasing accruals as if they are of good quality. 
Investors can’t distinguish if an insider selling is encouraged by liquidity or by 
information. It is also possible that investors “discount insider selling signals that are 
contrary to their beliefs about a firm’s earnings” (Beneish and Vargus, 2002, p. 757). 
Leuz et al. (2003) also approach the earnings management but from a different angle and 
provide evidence that earnings management is less of a concern in common law countries 
due to high investor protection. 
Kang et al. (2006) also use discretionary accruals as a topic of investigation and they tried 
to understand whether aggregate discretionary accruals or aggregate total accruals are the 
better predictor of stock returns. They conclude that both the aggregate normal accruals 
and equal-weigh aggregate discretionary accrual do not provide considerable forecasting 
power. On the other side, value-weighted aggregate discretionary accruals provide strong 
forecasting power. 
 
2.3.4 The Market Participants Misinterpretation 
Bradshaw et al. (2001) stated that sell side analysts are not able to distinguish between the 
different characteristics of the earnings components. In fact, the market participants are not 
able to predict the earnings reversal on extreme accruals, with firms with high and low 
accruals reporting the highest forecasting errors on earnings. 
Barth and Hutton (2004) also investigate the topic and conclude that analysts, overall, 
can’t interpret in a correct way the information that is related to accruals within the 
reported earnings. Consequently, an investment strategy that is supported on the 
information provided by these particular market participants and in accruals’ information 
is able to yield abnormal returns that proved to be statistically significant. 
Other studies, like the one from Collins et al. (2003), mention that there’s a particular 
group of investors (the more sophisticated ones) that are able to interpret the different 
information contained in earnings. However, this was only verified in a portion of the 
several procedures that were tested. 
11 
 
 
2.3.5 Growth Hypothesis 
Zhang (2007), following the footsteps of those authors, tested whether the accrual anomaly 
is attributable to growth as opposed to earnings persistence – the Growth Hypothesis. 
Basically, Zhang (2007) examine if the accrual anomaly is mainly motivated by the 
fundamental growth information contained in accruals contrary to accounting distortion or 
managerial discretion. In his research, Zhang (2007) discovered that accruals show strong 
(insignificant) power predicting future stock returns in companies where accruals capture 
strong (weak) growth information. Moreover, when decomposing accruals into growth-
related and growth-unrelated components, the author found evidence that the first has 
more power when predicting future stock returns than the latter. So, he concluded that the 
accrual anomaly is mainly attributable to the growth information that is contained within 
the accruals. 
 
2.3.6 The Methodology Adopted 
Kraft et al. (2006) refer that the anomaly could be explained by several boundaries – 
selection biases, data treatment and data errors – in the methodology. However, this not 
means that the anomaly disappear when we account for that boundaries. The authors 
conclude that the anomaly is still present but is driven mainly by the high accruals deciles. 
Similarly, Desai et al. (2004) found evidence that the anomaly seems to be concentrated in 
the highest accruals firms. 
 
2.3.7 The “Irrationality” of Agents 
Several authors argue that investors act in an irrational way and, consequently, cause the 
anomaly. However, as it is known, this topic – rationality against irrationality of investors 
– divides the financial community, casting disagreement and opposing opinions. 
In favor of rationality were Wu et al. (2007). Assuming that we interpret accruals as a 
working capital investment, the authors conjecture that firms adjust their accruals to 
discount rate changes in an optimal way based on the q-theory. Wu et al. (2007) conclude 
that associated to higher discount rates are the less profitable investments and lower 
accruals (vice-versa) – Optimal Investment Hypothesis. The rationale behind the theory is 
that when the discount rates increase, there are less viable and profitable projects so we 
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verify a decreasing in accruals. Allied to this, there’s an increase in future returns on 
average because the higher discount rate means higher expected returns going forward. As 
a result, accruals negatively predict future returns. 
The same authors, by studying the Optimal Investment Hypothesis from different 
perspectives, reach the conclusion that since investment is a value driver of the accrual 
effect, by controlling such variable we should expect a reduction in the magnitude of the 
accruals anomaly. They even go further and state that investment is probably more 
significant when comparing to earnings in driving the anomaly. By studying the optimal 
investment hypothesis the authors also claim that since we verify a negative relation 
between investment an discount rates, accruals should covary negatively with the ex ante 
estimates of the discount rate. Last but not least, they also defend that “the deterioration of 
the accrual effect in recent years might be temporary and likely to mean-revert in the near 
future” (Wu et al., 2007, p. 177). 
 
2.3.8 The Risk Factor 
Khan (2005) approach the topic from a risk perspective. For him, the differences found in 
portfolios with high and low levels of accruals can be explained by differences in risk 
associated to each. Khan (2005) found evidence that firms with low accruals and 
consequently higher returns are the ones in which the bankruptcy risk is higher. He also 
revealed that accruals are more related with risk proxies – economic and financial distress 
characteristics – rather than risk itself. 
 
2.3.9 Anomaly as a Collateral Effect of Other Anomalies 
There are several studies in the literature that look at the accrual anomaly as an effect of 
broader anomalies. 
Collins and Hribar (2000) tried to discover if the accruals anomaly can be, somehow, 
explained by the post-earnings announcement drift documented by Ball and Brown (1968) 
and Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990). The results showed that these two anomalies are 
independent from each other. 
The research of Desai et al. (2004) and Fairfield et al. (2003a, b) suggested that the accrual 
anomaly might be related to growth. According to Desai et al. (2004), the anomaly is 
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somehow linked with another one: the Value-Glamour Anomaly, already documented in 
the literature. Fairfield et al. (2003a) argued that the accruals anomaly is a particular case 
of a “greater” anomaly based on growth in net operating assets. As so, they decided to 
explore the relation between the accruals anomaly and the growth anomaly. This anomaly 
reflects the market’s lack of ability to correctly assess firms’ growth prospects. They 
conclude that the mispricing of accruals is not the main responsible for the accruals 
anomaly as they find out that the accruals and cash flow components do not exhibit 
significant differences in persistence. In matter of fact, they defend that the accruals 
anomaly is part of a broader anomaly – the Growth Anomaly. They even refer in their 
article that Sloan’s (1996) findings are a special case of a more general effect – the growth 
effect – that can be explained by diminishing marginal returns to investment and/or 
conservative accounting. Disagreeing from Fairfield et al. (2003) were Shon and Zhou 
(2005). They suggested that both anomalies are actually different from each other. 
 
2.3.10. The Legal System 
Many authors in the literature defend that the law prevailing in the country can also be an 
incentive for the appearance of the anomaly. Dechow et al. (2011b) found that the anomaly 
appears to be stronger in common law countries than in code law countries (Portugal and 
Spain), with Pincus el al. (2007) being more extreme and saying that the anomaly only 
appears in common law countries. The latter explain that in code law countries we verify a 
lower asymmetry of information between stakeholders and firm executives and 
consequently, in those countries there are a better understanding of earnings and its 
components. 
Differently, LaFond (2005) and Leippold and Lohre (2010) found evidence in both civil 
(code) and common law countries.  
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3. Development of Hypothesis 
Understanding financial information is key for success when applying a particular strategy 
instead of another. In fact, it is quite important that any investor, when analyzing earnings, 
is able to distinguish between cashflows and accruals since they have associated different 
levels of persistence and have different implications for the assessment of future earnings. 
Bernstein (1993) advise us to trust more on CFO and less on accruals since the latter is 
subject to a higher level of distortion: “the accrual system, which produces the income 
number, relies on accruals, deferrals, allocations and valuations, all of which involve 
higher degrees of subjectivity than what enters the determination of CFO” (Sloan, 1996, p. 
291). As so, we can attest the quality of earnings by analyzing the weight of these two 
earnings’ components in the overall income that the firms releases, with the earnings 
supported by casflows being of more quality than the ones relying on accruals. Following 
this reasoning, it is also expected that the current earnings performance is likely to persist 
if earnings are based more on cashflows than on accruals.  
To test whether this is true in the markets under study, the first testable hypothesis will try 
to infer about the persistence: 
H1: The current earnings performance is declining as the accrual component of 
earnings increases and increasing as the cashflows component of earnings 
increases. 
By studying this hypothesis, we will be able to understand investors’ behavior towards 
earnings: can investors distinguish the different components of earnings and its different 
persistence levels or they act as having some kind of myopia which makes them not to 
recognize the characteristics associated to each? 
Similarly to Sloan (1996), the unbiased behavior of stock prices lead us to build another 
hypothesis to test. By decomposing results into its components, we intend to analyze in 
which extent stock prices reflect the different properties of accruals’ and cashflows’ 
components of earnings. Undeniably, if investors can’t distinguish the different 
components of earnings, they will suffer from forecasting errors and therefore misprice 
securities, meaning that stocks with high (low) level of accruals will be purchased for the 
major (small) part of investors, driving the price up (down) and consequently overvaluing 
(undervaluing) the stock. Indeed, this mispricing will be corrected in the future when the 
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persistence does not follow the investor’s expectations, meaning that investors that do not 
look at the different components of earnings instead of abnormal returns can suffer from 
losses.  
Ball and Brown (1968) found a positive relation between earnings and stock prices that 
was justified by the ability of earnings to reflect all the relevant information of a company. 
However, many authors defend that this positive relation between price and earnings is 
only due to the incapacity of investors distinguish between earnings components, leading 
us to formulate the second testable hypothesis: 
H2: Stock prices fail to reflect the higher persistence associated to the cashflow 
component of earning and the lower persistence associated to the accrual 
component of earnings.  
With this hypothesis, we will try to test in which extent prices deviates from the rational 
expectations model. So, following Sloan (1996), we will test the “naïve expectations 
model” (investors fixate on earnings) against the null hypothesis of market efficiency.  
If investors can’t distinguish the different levels of persistence that is associated to each 
component of earnings, it is expected that they will overprice stocks with a higher accrual 
component and underprice stocks that have a lower component of accruals, creating, 
therefore, an arbitrage opportunity. This leads us to the third testable hypothesis:  
H3: A trading strategy that combines a long and a short position in stock firms 
with the lowest and highest reported accruals, respectively, can generate positive 
abnormal returns. 
The results will evidence if investors can exploit this market flaw, yielding abnormal 
returns.  
The last topic that our study will address is related with abnormal accruals and earnings 
manipulation. Similarly to Xie (2001), we will try to find evidence of earnings 
management, leading us to formulate the fourth and final hypothesis: 
H4: The market correctly prices abnormal accruals regarding to their one-year-
ahead firm earnings. 
Recall that, according to Xie (2001) earnings manipulation is made through abnormal 
accruals (also denominated discretionary accruals).   
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Recurring to the Mishkin (1983)’s test, we will be able to compare the theoretical 
abnormal accruals computed by the Modified Jones Model with the abnormal accruals 
priced by the market. By using this technique, we can conjecture if the lack of accruals 
persistence documented by Sloan (1996) is due to the abnormal accruals (market 
assessment of persistence) or to the normal accruals (historical earnings persistence).   
If results show that the valuation attributable to abnormal returns by the market is 
significantly larger than its forecasting coefficient, then we can conclude that the market is 
overpricing abnormal accruals. On the other hand, if the valuation of the market is smaller 
than the forecasting coefficient, the market is underpricing abnormal accruals. Based on 
the outcomes, Xie (2001) attributed any market’s mispricing as a failure to properly 
distinguish different levels of persistence, as the forecasting coefficient is a measure of 
abnormal accruals’ persistence according to Freeman et al. (1982) and Sloan (1996).   
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4. Data and Methodology 
To conduct our empirical analysis, we consider all public firms in Portugal and Spain, 
quoted in PSI Geral and Bolsa de Madrid with all available information, in the period of 
1995 to 2013
5
. Both accounting variables and stock prices were extracted from the 
Datastream database. 
From the sample were excluded 1) banks, companies that belonged to the financial sector 
and life insurance companies since they do not have the financial information needed to 
calculate accruals; 2) anonymous sports societies due to their very specialized accounting 
systems; 3) companies that were unclassified; 4) companies quoted in another market 
different from the origin market and 4) companies with missing information in general or 
insufficient data to calculate accruals.  
Moreover, for the sake of consistency, we will only include in our sample firms with the 
same fiscal year, otherwise accounting information will be available in the market in two 
different moments in time. This approach is consistent with the one followed by Sloan but 
different from Xie’ (2001). Instead, the author preferred to adjust the sample and form 12 
hedge portfolios, one for each fiscal year-end month and conduct the hedge portfolio test 
separately for each of the 12 fiscal year-end months. 
In the end, my sample is composed by 33 Portuguese companies and 93 Spanish 
companies, in a total of 125 firms and 2,299 firm-year observations.  
This study implies the formulation of several hypotheses and depends on econometric 
inference to achieve results.  
Following Sloan (1996), after defining the testable hypothesis and the sample to which our 
study applies, we need to compute the variables that assume particular relevance in our 
study – Earnings, Accruals and Cashflows. 
Earnings is the operating income after depreciation defined in Datastream as the “earnings 
of a company before interest expense and income taxes. It is calculated by taking the pre-
tax income and adding back interest expense on debt and subtracting interest capitalized”. 
As Dechow et al. (1995) and Sloan (1996), we calculate accruals as follow: 
                                                 
5
 Initially, the period of the analysis started in 1994 and ended in 2014 but do to the fewer observation in the 
extreme years, we decide to shorten the sample. 
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      (            )  (               )       (1) 
where, 
    , is the accruals in period t; 
    , is the change in current assets in period t; 
      , is the change in cash/cash equivalents in period t; 
    , is the change in current liabilities in period t; 
     , is the debt included in current liabilities in period t; 
    , is the income taxes payable in period t; 
    , is the depreciation and amortization expenses in period t. 
In this definition, it is excluded the debt in current liabilities because it is related to 
financing transactions and only operating transactions should be considered. Moreover, 
income taxes payable are also not considered to maintain the consistency with the concept 
of earnings that was used by the authors in the empirical tests.  
All the variables were extracted directly from the database with the exception of short-
term debt and depreciations since the variables were not available per se. The short-term 
debt was calculated as the difference between total debt and long term debt and 
depreciations were calculated as the difference between EBITDA (Earnings Before 
Interest, Taxes, Depreciations and Amortizations) and EBIT (Earnings Before Interest and 
Taxes). 
Following Sloan, cashflows were calculated as the residual part of earnings and accruals. 
Since the empirical analysis requires both cross-sectional and temporal comparisons (panel 
data), we scale the following three components by the average total assets (Sloan, 1996): 
 
      
                                  
                     6
 
(2) 
 
     
         
                     
 
(3) 
 
                                                 
6
 T refers to the variation between the period t and t-1. 
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(4) 
 
In our analysis, we also wanted to infer in which magnitude each accrual component – 
Current Assets, Current Liabilities and Depreciations – affects the total accruals. So, by 
decomposing this variable into those components, we were able to reach important 
conclusions that will be detailed in further sections. The variables were measured as 
follow: 
 
           
           
                     
 (5) 
 
            
               
                     
 
(6) 
 
 
      
    
                     
 
   
Investors often try to beat the market with their strategies and predictions. When they 
suspect the presence of an anomaly, investors see an opportunity to yield abnormal returns 
and they promptly define a strategy to exploit this arbitrage opportunity to extract as much 
value as they can get.  
To study the trading strategy defined before, we first ranked firms by its accruals and build 
quartiles with the extreme observations. We only include in the study companies that have 
both available information for the calculation of accruals and historical stock prices
7
.  
Before computing abnormal accruals, there are several key aspects that we need to be 
aware of. The way we calculate abnormal returns have a great impact in the conclusions 
our study reach. Zach (2003) in his article list several aspects that are important to be well 
defined before the returns’ calculation. Firstly, it is important to be careful when choosing 
the benchmark portfolio used to adjust firms’ raw returns (size, book-to-market, others) 
because the magnitude of those returns can be affected by the adjustment that we made. 
                                                 
7
 Since Datastream database do not recognize when a particular company delists, we assume that if a 
company does not suffer variations in price in a period longer than 12 months, is delisted. 
(7) 
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Secondly, we need to see which valuing scheme – equally or value weighted portfolios – 
we want to follow since the adoption of one over the other also affects the magnitude of 
our abnormal returns. Thirdly, we also should be aware that, when building portfolios, we 
need to decide if we will have a dynamic portfolio that changes composition according to 
the ranking of accruals in a particular period (for instance, every month) or if we opt for a 
portfolio that is built according to its accrual ranking in the begin of the period and stays 
unchanged for the rest of the time ((unchanged portfolios vs. (re)balanced portfolios). And 
lastly, we must decide if returns are calculated by a buy-hold procedure or by using the 
cumulative abnormal returns technique.  
In this study, the portfolios that were built according to the ranking of accruals are equally 
weighted portfolios, meaning that when measuring returns, every stock will have the same 
weight in the portfolio. Abnormal returns are calculated for the three subsequent years. The 
return cumulation period starts 4 months after the end of the fiscal year in which accruals 
are measured. According to Alford et al. (1994) and Sloan (1996), we should give this lag 
before starting calculating the returns to guarantee that the financial statement are available 
and consequently the prices reflect all the available information in the market. If, for 
instance, a company delisted according to the procedure we adopted (already explained 
before), we decide to divide the return cumulation period in two parts (or more, depending 
how many companies have delisted in different periods), with the weight given to each of 
the periods being different, since the composition of the portfolio is different in these two 
(or more) moments.  
The prices
8
, as was already mentioned before, were extracted from Datastream. 
The computation of abnormal returns requires that we make an adjustment for size. 
According to Sloan (1996) and following Ou and Penman (1989) and Bernard and Thomas 
(1990), we should try to understand if our strategy yields abnormal returns by comparing 
the annual buy-hold returns of our portfolio with the annual buy-hold returns of a portfolio 
with approximately the same market value. Once again, following Sloan (1996), we build 
portfolios ranking firms by its market value of equity at the beginning of the year in which 
the return cumulation period begins. After building this market value ranking, we chose to 
each security in our accrual ranked portfolio, whenever possible, the observation 
                                                 
8
 Sloan (1996) used stock returns inclusive of dividends so, we extract from Datastream the adjusted price to 
reflect this particular condition. 
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immediately before as a proxy for our new size-matched portfolio. Consequently, the 
abnormal returns are computed as the difference between a firm’s annual buy-and-hold 
return and the annual buy-hold return for the same period on the market capitalization-
based portfolio (Xie, 2001). In our study, these portfolios stay unchanged for the entire 
period, changing only between years. 
Finally, when opting between the buy-hold abnormal returns (       ) or the cumulative 
abnormal returns (      ) technique to calculate the returns of exploiting the strategy, we 
selected the first method over the latter: 
 
        ∏(     )  ∏(     )
 
 
 
 
 
(8) 
where, 
      , is the Buy-Hold annual return in year t for the i firm: 
i, is the firm for which we are calculating the return; 
t, is the year in which we are measuring the returns. 
 We opt for this procedure because, according to Zach (2003), this method “correctly 
tracks the returns earned by a buy-and-hold investor because it takes into account the 
compounding of returns” (Zach, 2003, p.18) contrary to which we should expect from 
      . He justifies his choice by saying that the “CAR method does not compound returns 
and therefore its returns do not reflect the profits (or losses) of investors. If researchers 
are specifically interested in returns to trading strategies, like in the case of the accrual 
anomaly, then BHAR is preferred” (Zach, 2003, p.18). However, it is important to be 
aware that the method adopted produces returns that are much more skewed and more 
open to cross-sectional dependence problems
9
. 
Once rankings and the way we calculate abnormal accruals are defined, the abnormal 
returns for each quartile can be calculated by averaging the abnormal returns of all firms in 
a particular quartile. 
                                                 
9
 Tzachi Zach (2003) applied a calendar-time approach which addresses cross sectional dependence and 
skewness and the statistical significance of the returns did not change. 
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Lastly, as it’s our objective to discover if managers manipulate, in fact, earnings, we will 
calculate abnormal accruals since, according to Xie (2001), this component of accruals is 
the accrual component that is easier to manipulate.  
Xie (2001) used the Jones (1991) model
10
 to compute the normal accruals, being the 
residual part of accruals, the abnormal accrual. However, since Dechow et. al. (1995) 
defended that a Modified Jones Model provides a more powerful test of earnings 
management compared to Healy (1985) and the Standard Jones Model, we applied this 
procedure to calculate normal accruals. The model can be described as follow: 
 
       (
 
       
)     (
               
       
)     (
    
       
)     
(9) 
     where, 
    , is the accruals already deflated by the average total assets in period t; 
       , is the average total assets between periods; 
     , is the variation in the revenues between periods; 
         , is the variation in net receivables between periods; 
    , is the gross property, plant and equipment in period t. 
Please note that according to this model, we should divide the variables by the total assets 
at the beginning of the period. However, we change this criterion for consistency reasons 
since all the other variables were scaled by the average total assets.  
After the computation of these two accrual’s components – normal accruals and abnormal 
accruals – to be able to understand if the market is over or underestimating the abnormal 
accruals compared to its one-year-ahead earnings implications, we will employ the 
Mishkin (1983)’s test, similarly to Xie (2001). This test is supported by two equations: 
 
                                        (10) 
                                                 
10
 The author alerted us to be careful when using the Jones Model since this model not captures only 
managerial discretion leading to “unintentional misstatements”. 
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       )       (11) 
where, 
     , is the income before extraordinary items in year t; 
    , is the cash flow from operations in year t; 
    , is the normal accruals in year t; 
      , is the abnormal accrual is year t; 
          , is the size-adjusted return in year t+1; 
With these two equations – the forecasting equation in (10) and the valuation equation in 
(11) – we will be able to compare the theoretical results achieved by the model with the 
real market results, understanding this way if the market under or overprices the ability of 
a particular earnings’ component to forecast one-year-ahead earnings. So, firstly, we need 
to estimate the coefficients of each earnings component in each equation separately and in 
a second phase, by comparing the coefficients of both equations jointly (imposing the 
restriction of the coefficient of the forecast equation to be equal to the one of the valuation 
equation), we can infer in which extent market misprices the components. However, it is 
important to mention that this procedure has its own limitations.  
Although we can easily understand the value of Mishkin (1983)’s test, Kraft et al. (2007) 
alert us to the main flaws of using this technique. According to those authors, the Mishkin 
(1983)’s test is “sensitive to the presence of omitted variables (…) that are themselves 
mispriced when attempting to draw inferences about specific components of earnings (e.g. 
accruals and cash flows)” (Soares and Stark, 2011, p. 3). Other authors, namely, Kothari 
et al. (2005), referred that this test is sensitive to the treatment of extreme observations. 
And the list of criticism goes on. Francis and Smith (2005) mentioned that the Mishkin 
(1983)’s test has some flaws when using cross-sectional estimates to investigate the 
presence of the accruals anomaly. Pope (2001) also discredits the Mishkin (1983)’s test by 
pointing out that if we have different forecasting implications for one-year-ahead accruals 
and cash flows, abnormal accruals can’t be model as a function of unexpected earnings 
alone. However, despite its limitations, it is the best technique when trying to studying this 
particular subject.  
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5. Empirical Results 
After the consolidation of the hypothesis and procedures in previous sections, we applied 
our methodology to our firm sample and we tested the several formulated hypothesis. 
Since they relate somehow accruals and earnings, we decide to first observe how earnings 
and its two components – accruals and cashflows – behave. By observing the Panel I of 
Table 1, we found evidence of a negative relation between accruals and cashflows in both 
markets, with the earnings increasing as accruals increase, similar to Dechow et al. (1994) 
and Sloan’s (1996) findings. 
Table 1: Mean (Median) Values of the Ranking Accruals Quartile Portfolios 
 
Portugal 
 
Spain 
 
Q1 Q2 Q3      Q4 
 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Panel I: Component of Earnings 
          
EARN
a
 0,067 0,053 0,058 0,090 
 
0,045 0,084 0,078 0,083 
 (0,070) (0,047) (0,057) (0,062)  (0,035) (0,089) (0,078) (0,088) 
ACC
b
 -0,119 -0,058 -0,028 0,028 
 
-0,130 -0,057 -0,022 0,060 
 (-0,116) (-0,059) (-0,024) (0,022)  (-0,125) (-0,058) (-0,021) (0,045) 
CFO
c
 0,164 0,106 0,082 0,052 
 
0,165 0,143 0,104 0,032 
 (0,140) (0,114) (0,096) (0,041)  (0,179) (0,148) (0,104) (0,025) 
Panel II: Component of Accruals 
       
          
CURR ASST
d
 -0,021 0,000 0,040 0,079 
 
-0,035 0,014 0,030 0,105 
 (-0,021) (0,000) (0,040) (0,079)  (-0,015) (0,011) (0,022) (0,092) 
CURR LIAB
e
 -0,024 -0,006 -0,021 -0,002 
 
-0,023 -0,018 -0,015 -0,020 
 (-0,024) (-0,006) (-0,021) (-0,002)  (-0,016) (-0,019) (-0,007) (-0,026) 
DEP
f
 -0,066 -0,050 -0,053 -0,046 
 
-0,059 -0,052 -0,039 -0,035 
 (-0,066) (-0,050) (-0,053) (-0,046)  (-0,059) (-0,052) (-0,041) (-0,035) 
a 
Earnings: income from continuing operations deflated by the average total assets.  
a
Accruals: the change in non-cash current assets, less the change in current liabilities and depreciation 
expenses, deflated by the average total assets.  
c 
Cashflows: the difference between earnings and accruals (both deflated by the average total assets). 
d
 Current Assets: the change in non-cash current assets deflated by the average total assets.  
e
 Current Liabilities: minus the change in current liabilities deflated by the average total assets.  
f
 Depreciations: minus the depreciation expense deflated by the average total assets.  
g
 Q stands for Quartile. 
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The Panel II shows the decomposition of accruals into its main components. We can notice 
that current assets and depreciation expenses increase as accruals increase, corroborating 
Sloan (1996)’s findings. However, current assets seem to be the ones that impact accruals 
the most since they assume, generally, the greater percentage on accruals.  The current 
liabilities and current assets according to Sloan (1996) have a negative relation, results that 
our research also corroborates, being quite intuitive to say that growing firms usually 
experience high working capital requirements since this is the most inexpensive way for a 
firm to grow. Our data shows that firms with increasing accruals register both an increase 
in current assets and decrease in current liabilities, increasing this way working capital 
requirements. Depreciations increase linearly as we move down quartiles. 
To be able to identify the outliers, we use the excel function TRIMMEAN. This function 
calculates the mean, excluding a particular percentage of data, half from the top and half 
from the bottom. In our particular case, we decide to exclude 20% of the total firm sample.  
The number of observations to exclude was achieved by simply multiplying the number of 
observations by the percentage, with the largest and smallest observations being the ones 
that were removed. If the TRIMMEAN and the mean were equal, we did not exclude any. 
Testing H1 
The first testable hypothesis, as it was stated in previous sections, expects to confirm the 
different persistence levels of earning’s components. Following Sloan (1996)11, we 
compute the following regressions: 
                         (12) 
                               (13) 
By estimating equation (12), we were able to assess in which magnitude the earnings of the 
next year are a reflection of the present earnings. However, since we also wanted to infer 
about the different persistence levels of earnings, we computed equation (13), 
disintegrating earnings in their two components – accruals and cashflows.  
Table 2 and 3 illustrate the impact of current earnings on future performance and the 
average level of earnings persistence of each component of accruals, respectively. 
                                                 
11
 Sloan (1996) build this hypothesis following the work of Freeman et al. (1982). 
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Table 2: Results of estimating an OLS Regression to examine the impact of Current 
Earnings
a
 on Future Earnings performance 
 
Coefficients St. Error T-statistic Significance  
 Panel I: Regressions using actual values – Portugal 
     α0 0,003 0,014 0,203 0,840 
α1 0,706 0,186 3,798 0,000 
     Model Significance:  0,000 
   R
2
 0,093 
   
     Test α1=0 
    Marginal Siginificance  0,000 
   
     Panel II: Regressions using actual values – Spain 
     α0 0,009 0,005 1,731 0,084 
α1 0,683 0,040 1,697 0,000 
     Model Significance:  0,000 
   R
2
 0,446 
   
     Test α1=0 
    Marginal Siginificance 0,084 
   
 
        
a
 Earnings: Income of a company before interest expense and income taxes, It is calculated by taking the 
pre-tax income and adding back interest expense on debt and subtracting interest capitalized. This variable 
was deflated by the average total assets. 
 
Overall results show that earnings are mean-reverting, with the average persistence 
parameter, α1, being 0,706 and 0,683 for Portugal and Spain, respectively. 
By testing if α1=0, the results allow us to conclude that, in both countries, the earnings 
performance is transitory, for a significance level of 10%, meaning that current earnings 
explain future earnings performance. 
Results presented in Table 3 show us that in both in Portugal and in Spain,     <     , 
reflecting the lower persistence of accruals regarding cashflows. In Portugal, the accruals 
persistence coefficient, γ1, is -0,127, against the cashflows persistence coefficient, γ2, of 
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0,009. In Spain, γ1 is 0,547 against γ2 of 0,659, respectively. Moreover, when testing if the 
coefficients are equal (γ1 = γ2), we reject the null hypothesis for both markets, when a 
significance level of 10% is considered, confirming the different persistence levels 
associated to the different earnings components. 
These findings are consistent with the ones already documented in the literature. 
 
Table 3: Results of estimating an OLS Regression to examine the impact of 
Cashflows
a
 and Accruals
b
 on Future Earnings
c
 performance 
 
Coefficients St. Error T-statistic Significance 
 
     Panel I: Regressions using actual values - Portugal 
     γ0 0,040 0,010 4,052 0,000 
γ1  -0,127 0,104 -1,217 0,226 
γ2 0,009 0,022 0,407 0,684 
     Test if γ1 = γ2 
    Marginal Significance  0,0983 
   
     Panel II: Regressions using actual values - Spain 
     γ0 0,007 0,005 1,403 0,162 
γ1  0,547 0,046 1,202 0,000 
γ2 0,659 0,042 1,572 0,000 
     Test if γ1 = γ2 
    Marginal Significance 0,001 
             
a 
Cashflows: difference between Earnings (defined as earnings of a company before interest expense and 
income taxes. It is calculated by taking the pre-tax income and adding back interest expense on debt and 
subtracting interest capitalized) and Accruals. Both variables were deflated by the average total assets. 
c
 Earnings: income of a company before interest expense and income taxes. It is calculated by taking the 
pre-tax income and adding back interest expense on debt and subtracting interest capitalized. This variable 
was deflated by the average total assets. 
b
 Accruals: difference between the change in non-cash assets, the current liabilities and the depreciation 
expenses. This variable was deflated by the average total assets. 
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Testing H2 
The second testable hypothesis tries to detect if prices reflect the different features of 
earnings components. Both Sloan (1996) and Xie (2001) recur to the Mishkin (1983)’s test 
to test the rational expectations theory, so, following their guidelines we will test together 
the following regressions: 
                         (14) 
             (             
      )       (15) 
 
And 
                               (16) 
             (             
        
     )       (17) 
 
By building this equation system, we can compare the results of the forecasting equations 
(14) and (16) with the ones obtained from the valuation equations (15) and (17), allowing 
us to trace the extent in which the market follows its fundamental principles.  
The results from estimating equations (14) and (15) are illustrated in Table 4. 
By testing      
 , we seek to discover if stock prices anticipate this difference in 
earnings persistence performance. In other words, we are testing for efficiency of markets.  
In Portugal, the earning’s coefficient in the forecasting equation, α1, is 0,727 and the 
earning’s coefficient in the valuation equation, α1
*
, is 1,614. In Spain, the earning’s 
coefficient in the forecasting equation, α1, is 0,681 and the earning’s coefficient in the 
valuation equation, α1
*
, is -1,806. However it seemed that the market was overpricing 
(underpricing) earnings in Portugal (Spain), there isn’t statistical significance inference to 
reject H0, meaning that our results don´t classify the markets as being inefficient. This 
hypothesis was not also rejected by Sloan (1996) in his study.  
The results from estimating equations (16) and (17) are illustrated in Table 5. 
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Table 4: Results derived from a Nonlinear Weighted Least Squares estimation to 
analyze the information content of Current Earnings
a
 in Future Earnings and the 
respectively impact on Stock Price
b
 performance 
  
Estimate St. Error T-statistic Significance  
  
      Panel I: Regressions using actual values of financial statement variables – Portugal 
      α0 0,001 0,014 0,061 0,952 
α1 0,727 0,186 3,918 0,000 
α1
*
 1,614 0,708 2,280 0,023 
βc 1,168 0,514 2,273 0,024 
      Testing Market Efficiency  α1 = α1* 
  Marginal Significance  0,206 
  
      Panel II: Regressions using actual values of financial statement variables – Spain 
      α0 0,009 0,005 1,665 0,096 
α1 0,681 0,044 1,543 0,000 
α1
*
 -1,806 2,514 -0,718 0,473 
β 0,664 0,650 1,021 0,308 
      Testing Market Efficiency  α1 = α1* 
  Marginal Significance  0,323 
            
a
 Earnings: income of a company before interest expense and income taxes. It is calculated by taking the 
pre-tax income and adding back interest expense on debt and subtracting interest capitalized. This variable 
was deflated by the average total assets. 
b 
Abnormal Returns: computed as the difference between the raw buy-hold return and the return of a similar 
market portfolio. To calculate the returns we, per Sloan, use the adjusted price to include dividends and other 
liquidation distributions. The return cumulation period begins after 4 months in which the financial variables 
were calculated. 
c 
β: a valuation multiplier.  
Since we do not reject the null hypothesis of efficiency, the results shown in the table 
below that confirm       should allow us to conclude that   
    
 , meaning that the 
efficiency of markets should guarantee that stock prices reflect the different impact that 
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accruals and cashflows have on earnings. However, although we verify this premise to 
Spain, the same does not holds in Portugal
12
. 
Table 5: Results from estimating a Nonlinear Weighted Least Squares Regression to 
examine the impact of information contained in Cashflows and Accruals on Stock 
Price performance 
   
Estimate St. Error T-statistic Significance  
   Panel I: Regressions using actual values of financial statement variables – Portugal 
       γ0 0,044 0,012 3,677 0,000 
γ1  -0,110 0,126 -0,874 0,383 
γ2 0,008 0,027 0,297 0,767 
γ1
*
 2,384 2,556 0,932 0,352 
γ2
*
 -0,067 0,256 -0,261 0,794 
β 0,519 0,484 1,072 0,284 
       Testing Market Efficiency  γ1 = γ1* and γ2 = γ2* 
  Marginal Significance 0,616 
   
       Panel II: Regressions using actual values of financial statement variables – Spain 
       γ0 0,007 0,005 1,423 0,155 
γ1  0,547 0,045 1,207 0,000 
γ2 0,658 0,042 1,581 0,000 
γ1
*
 -1,282 0,946 -1,356 0,176 
γ2
*
 -0,482 0,620 -0,778 0,437 
β 1,302 0,613 2,124 0,034 
       Testing Market Efficiency  γ1 = γ1* and γ2 = γ2* 
  Likelihood ratio statistic  0,154 
     
The variables used to compute the model were defined/ calculated as follow:  
- Earnings: income of a company before interest expense and income taxes. It is calculated by taking the 
pre-tax income and adding back interest expense on debt and subtracting interest capitalized. This variable 
was deflated by the average total assets. 
- Accruals: difference between the change in non-cash assets, the current liabilities and the depreciation 
expenses. This variable was deflated by the average total assets. 
                                                 
12
 The results, once again, do not reject the null hypothesis of market efficiency. We believe that even when 
markets are efficient, there are moments in time that create arbitrage opportunities for the existence of the 
anomaly. However, is that efficiency that will correct those momentaneous opportunities and erode the 
abnormal returns. 
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- Cashflows: difference between Earnings and Accruals (both deflated by the average total assets).  
- Abnormal Returns: computed as the difference between the raw buy-hold return and the return of a 
similar market portfolio. To calculate the returns we, per Sloan, use the adjusted price to include dividends 
and other liquidation distributions. The return cumulation period begins after 4 months in which the financial 
variables were calculated. 
 
Similarly to Sloan’s findings in US, Portuguese and Spanish investors do not seem to 
fixate on earnings since          are different from α1. In fact, the Portuguese market 
attributes a higher persistence to accruals than cashflows, contrary to Spain, with investors 
treating accruals as a more persistent component of earnings that in fact it is. This means 
that, in Portugal, the market do not appear to anticipate the lower (higher) persistence in 
earnings performance that is associated to accruals (cashflows). Consequently, these 
findings allow us to speculate about the existence of the anomaly in Portugal, prediction 
that we will be able to confirm by testing H3.  
Testing H3  
To test our third hypothesis, we rank firms according to their accrual magnitude to be able 
to build equally weighted portfolios (quartiles). By computing the annual buy-hold return 
for each of the three subsequent years we were able to assess if a strategy that combines a 
long position in the lowest accruals portfolio with a short position in the highest accruals 
portfolio yields abnormal returns. The results are presented in Table 6. 
According to Schwert (2003), “anomalies are empirical results that seem to be 
inconsistent with maintained theories of asset pricing behavior”, (Schwert, 2003, p. 939). 
On one hand, researchers look at this phenomenon as a way to challenge literature and 
principles already defended. On the other, investors see anomalies as an opportunity to 
profit from a market flaw. So, analyzing the investors side and following Sloan, we tested 
if the strategy described before yields, indeed, abnormal returns.  
Panel I evidence decreasing marginal returns in Portugal, with this strategy yielding 
abnormal returns only in the first year of the strategy (20,4%, -1,1%% and -10,2%). 
Contrary, in Spain, we observe negative returns in the three periods in study, with these 
returns being less negative as the years pass by (-26,1%, -12,7% and -1,9%). Therefore, the 
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negative relation between accruals and stock returns – the accruals anomaly – is only 
present in Portugal (and not in Spain)
13
, as results in H2 suggested.   
Table 6: Abnormal Size-Adjusted Returns
a
 of Equal Weighted Accruals
b
 Portfolios 
Time Series 
 
Portugal 
 
Spain 
 
t+1 t+2 t+3 
 
t+1 t+2 t+3 
        Panel I: Abnormal returns covering all period from 1996 to 2013 
        Q1 0,040 0,012 -0,024 
 
-0,032 -0,139 -0,031 
Q4 -0,163 0,023 0,078 
 
0,230 -0,012 -0,013 
        Hedge
c
 0,204 -0,011 -0,102 
 
-0,261 -0,127 -0,019 
        Panel II : Abnormal returns from 2000 (inclusive) to 2006 
 
        Q1 0,028 -0,038 -0,162 
 
-0,092 -0,103 -0,196 
Q4 -0,090 -0,168 0,150 
 
0,268 -0,046 -0,027 
        Hedge 0,118 0,130 -0,313 
 
-0,360 -0,057 -0,169 
        Panel III: Abnormal returns from 2007 (inclusive) to 2013   
        Q1 0,092 -0,177 -0,107 
 
-0,003 -0,162 0,113 
Q4 -0,005 0,059 0,080 
 
-0,033 -0,032 0,151 
        Hedge 0,096 -0,236 -0,187 
 
0,030 -0,131 -0,038 
        
a
 Size-Adjusted Returns: the returns were computed as the difference between the raw buy-hold return of 
the portfolio and the raw buy-hold return of the correspondent size-matched portfolio. The size matched 
portfolio was created by ranking firms by its market value at the beginning of the year and choosing the 
observation immediately before as a proxy for the security held in accruals portfolio. 
b 
Accruals: difference between the change in non-cash assets, the current liabilities and the depreciation 
expenses. Accruals were deflated by the Average Total Assets. 
c
 Hedge: the hedge strategy consists in adopt a long position in the lowest accruals portfolio with a short 
position in the highest accruals portfolio. 
 
                                                 
13
 This conclusion takes in consideration all sample. 
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To investigate if the final crisis of 2007 was somehow responsible to spread or mitigate the 
anomaly, we divide de sample in two periods – before and after/during the financial crisis, 
considering the returns of the past 12 years. Panel II and Panel III report those results.  
Prior to the 2007 financial crisis, this strategy, in Portugal, yielded positive returns in the 
t+1 and t+2 (11,8%, 13,0% and -31,3%), with the return of first year being relative smaller 
and the return of second year being considerably higher than the ones we verified before 
(when we analyze all sample). In Spain, we observe that the returns for this period are, 
similarly to before, negative for all the years in consideration (-36,0%, -5,7% and -16,9%), 
with this particular time period explaining most of the results obtained in the Panel I. 
Post 2007, the returns achieved in Portugal decrease considerably, being positive only in 
the first year (9,6%, -23,6%, -18,7%). In Spain, surprisingly, we notice that this strategy 
yields positive returns in the first year of the strategy (3,01%) raising us some questions. 
To be able to understand if the positive results mean that the anomaly is appearing in 
recent years or not we divide this sample period in two: from 2007 to 2009 and from 2010 
to 2013. Non documented results show us that the strategy yielded positive returns from 
2007 to 2009, in t+1 and t+2, registering only losses in the t+3 (8,3%, 1,6% and -2,8%). 
From 2010 to 2013, the returns are negative in the three years (-0,9%, -27,7% and -5,1%), 
meaning that there’s no evidence of the accrual anomaly in Spain in recent years.  
The results allow us to conclude that in countries, like Portugal, where the anomaly is 
present, the 2007 financial crisis had a great impact in the magnitude of the returns earned 
by investors. In countries like Spain, where we did not find evidence of the anomaly
14
, the 
strategy cannot be applied and yield abnormal returns.  
We believe that the existence of the accruals anomaly is connected to the market 
attributing a higher persistence to accruals than cashflows. Recall that H2 confirmed these 
results for Portugal contrary to Spain. However, it is important to be aware that the (non) 
existence of the anomaly can also be a reflection of all of the problems that calculating the 
returns of this particular strategy bear. Kothari (2001) highlights the extreme skewness of 
long-term abnormal returns, the survival biases and inference problems arising from cross-
                                                 
14
 Since we only find positive abnormal returns in the period from 2007 to 2009, we believe that the anomaly 
is not present in this market. In fact, these positive returns can be connected to other factors extra-anomaly.  
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sectional dependence as the main difficulties faced by anyone trying to compute accruals’ 
anomaly abnormal returns. 
Regarding the anomaly as a consequence of the legal system of the country, our results 
point that the law of the country has weaker explication power in the appearance of the 
anomaly since both countries are code law countries and have both French origin. 
Agreeing is LaFond (2005), stating that the anomaly in neither connected to the legal 
framework the country is inserted to, neither with investor protection or the dependence on 
accruals accounting.  
A recent study of Goncharov et al. (2013) concluded that Spanish accruals are not 
associated with greater insider returns or income predictability, since the country hasn’t a 
flexible accounting system to record accruals. Moreover, Ball et al. (2000, 2003) argued 
that, in Spain, information flows easily between small stakeholders. Therefore, it not 
surprising that we did not found the anomaly in this market.  
Testing H4 
To test if the market prices cashflows and accruals components correctly regarding their 
one-year-ahead firm earnings, we follow Xie (2001)’s guidelines and we estimate the 
following regressions using an iterative nonlinear weighted least squares estimation 
procedure: 
                                        (18) 
              (             
        
        
       )
      
(19) 
      where, 
       , is the earnings in the period t+1; 
    , is the cashflows from operations in period t; 
    , is the normal accrual component in period t; 
      , is the abnormal accrual component in period t, 
          , is the sized-adjusted return in period t+1. 
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Please note that normal accruals are obtained by the Modified Jones Model, being the 
abnormal accrual the residual part of total accruals. 
Similarly to H2, we estimate equation (18) to observe the theoretical coefficients of 
cashflows and accruals components – normal and abnormal accruals – and we estimate 
equation (19) to understand the real pricing of those same variables by the market. Several 
tests were conducted and the results are presented in Table 7.  
By imposing   
    , we want to assess if the market rationally prices the variables under 
analysis (cashflows, normal accruals and abnormal accruals).  
In Portugal, the market seems to underprice cashflows (γ1=0,002; γ1
*
=-0,163) and 
overprice both components of accruals – normal accruals (γ2=-0,880; γ2
*
=10,934) and 
abnormal accruals (γ3=-0,077; γ3
*
= 4,867) – which is consistent with previous findings. To 
test whether these underprice of cashflows and overpricing of accruals components is 
statistically significant, we test      
  (i=1, 2, 3). The results, does not allow us to reject 
H0 neither for cashflows, neither for normal accruals and abnormal accruals. However, 
when we test the overprice of both components of accruals together, there is statistical 
significance inference, for a level of 10%, to reject H0, meaning that the market does not 
overprice, in the same magnitude, these two components of accruals. Comparing the 
coefficients attributable by the market, with the theoretical values provided by the forecast 
equation, we can affirm that the overprice is more severe for abnormal accruals, which is 
consistent with earnings manipulation of earnings by managers, contributing this way to 
the existence of the accruals anomaly in Portugal. 
In Spain, the market seems to underprice both cashflows (γ1 = 0,648; γ1
*
= -0,528) and 
accruals components – normal accruals (γ2= 0,570; γ2
*
=-1,554) and abnormal accruals (γ3= 
0,538; γ3
*
= -1,290). Following the same procedure, we test      
  (i=1, 2, 3) to see if the 
underprice is statistically significant. The results show that the underpricing of cashflows 
and abnormal accruals is statistically significant, contrary to the underpricing of normal 
accruals, when a significance level of 10% is assumed. This suggest that managers does 
not seem to manipulate accruals through abnormal accruals to present better earnings, once 
again evidencing why we did not find the anomaly in Spain. 
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Table 7: Results derived from an Nonlinear Weighted Least Squares Estimation of 
Cashflows’, Normal Accruals's and Abnormal Accruals's Market Pricing respecting 
to their one-year-ahead Earnings 
   
Estimate Std Error T-statistic  Significance 
   Panel I: Regressions using actual values of financial statement variables - Portugal 
γ0 
 
0,015 0,015 0,995 0,321 
γ1  
 
0,002 0,022 0,076 0,940 
γ2 
 
-0,880 0,351 -2,505 0,013 
γ3 
 
-0,077 0,104 -0,743 0,458 
γ1
*
 
 
-0,163 0,396 -0,411 0,681 
γ2
*
 
 
10,934 15,956 0,685 0,494 
γ3
*
 
 
4,867 6,480 0,751 0,453 
α 
 
-0,251 0,088 -2,850 0,005 
β 
 
0,382 0,485 0,788 0,432 
Testing   Chi-Square Significance  
 
 
γ1 = γ1* 
  
0,172 0,678 
 
 
γ2 = γ2* 
  
 0,548 0,459 
 
 
γ3 = γ3* 
  
 0,582  0,446 
 
 
γ2*=γ3* and γ2=γ3 
 
 5,360  0,069 
 
       Panel II: Regressions using actual values of financial statement variables - Spain 
γ0 
 
0,009 0,008 1,184 0,237 
γ1  
 
0,648 0,043 1,490 0,000 
γ2 
 
0,570 0,146 3,908 0,000 
γ3 
 
0,538 0,047 1,141 0,000 
γ1
*
 
 
-0,528 0,671 -0,787 0,431 
γ2
*
 
 
-1,554 1,634 -0,951 0,342 
γ3
*
 
 
-1,290 0,949 -1,359 0,174 
α 
 
0,007 0,090 0,080 0,936 
β 
 
1,320 0,614 2,150 0,032 
Testing:   Chi-Square Significance   
 
 
γ1 = γ1* 
  
 3,061 0,080 
 
 
γ2 = γ2* 
  
 1,676 0,196 
 
 
γ3 = γ3* 
  
3,703 0,054 
 
 
γ2*=γ3* and γ2=γ3 
 
 0,083  0,959 
        
 
   
The variables used to compute the model were defined/ calculated as follow: 
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- Earnings: income of a company before interest expense and income taxes. It is calculated by taking the 
pre-tax income and adding back interest expense on debt and subtracting interest capitalized. This variable 
was deflated by the average total assets. 
- Cashflows: difference between Earnings and Accruals (both deflated by the average total assets).  
- NAC (normal accruals): accruals predicted by the Modified Jones Model, estimated for firm-year 
observations. 
 
- ABNAC (abnormal accruals): residual value of accruals estimated by the Modified Jones Model for firm-
year observations. 
 
- Abnormal Returns: computed as the difference between the raw buy-hold return and the return of a 
similar market portfolio. To calculate the returns we, per Sloan, use the adjusted price to include dividends 
and other liquidation distributions. The return cumulation period begins after 4 months in which the financial 
variables were calculated. 
 
When testing the underpricing of both accruals components, the results do not allow us to 
reject the null hypothesis of the underpricing in the same extent. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
When trying to assess the financial strength of a company, investors, auditors and 
managers often recur to earnings as a key performance indicator. Therefore, it is really 
important that agents are aware of earnings’ different contributions and levels of 
persistence.  
The flexibility that accruals bring to financial statements is vital to record some cash 
inflows that a company is expecting to receive in a near future or even to record some 
depreciation expenses that were settled in some prior reporting period. However, since 
they are associated to high levels of subjectivity, it might create arbitrage opportunities 
either from managers, or from investors. If managers are focused in their empire building 
instead of doing what is best for shareholders, they will camouflage bad earnings with 
optimistic forecast through accruals or even worsen companies’ earnings to be able to 
benefit from tax shields. Consequently, prices will not reflect its fundamental value since 
earnings are biased, given investors an opportunity to profit from this market flaw.    
This study explores the contribution of these two major groups – managers and investors – 
to the anomaly both in Portugal and Spain. 
Our research shows, both in Portugal and in Spain, a lower persistence of accruals 
regarding cashflows. However, the Portuguese market doesn’t seem to be aware of this 
earning’s feature (contrary to the Spanish market) meaning that it attributes a higher 
persistence to accruals than to cashflows contributing to the accruals anomaly appearance.   
Moreover, our study showed that although the market appears to be overpricing 
(underpricing) earnings in Portugal (Spain), we could not reject the null hypothesis of 
market efficiency, leading us to believe that this disequilibrium might be temporary. 
When trying to exploit the anomaly, our results revealed decreasing marginal returns in 
Portugal, with this strategy yielding abnormal returns only in the first year of the strategy 
(20,4%, -1,1%% and -10,2%) and with the financial crisis impacting negatively the 
magnitude of returns yielded. Contrary, in Spain, we observe negative returns in the three 
periods in study, with these returns being less negative as the years pass by (-26,1%, -
12,7% and -1,9%). 
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Regarding the contribution of managers to the anomaly, we found evidence of earnings 
manipulation in Portugal but not in Spain, results that also support the existence of the 
anomaly in one market over the other. 
Overall, we believe that finding the anomaly is a consequence of the different persistence 
levels of earnings components, as documented by Sloan (1996). Besides, we consider that 
the way we define accruals, the way we calculate abnormal returns and the way we adjust 
for size has also a great impact in the results that we achieved.  
These results raise several topics for further research. As a consequence of new and 
challenging asset pricing theories and new ways of looking at market behavior, new 
research methodologies were developed. 
We advise that further researchers change some of our methodological aspects to be able to 
understand if the conclusions and the main insights remain the same. Since our study 
follows Sloan (1996)’s guidelines, when calculating abnormal returns although we control 
for divestitudes, we did not control for mergers. However, according to Zach (2003) 
mergers and acquisitions can affect earnings since the balance sheet of end-of-the-year of a 
merged firm is not equal, neither comparable, to the same balance sheet in the beginning-
of-the-year since the increase in several balance sheet variables transmit a false increase in 
accruals, creating some bias. Therefore, we should exclude from our sample companies in 
this situation. The same should be applied to IPOs and SEOs mainly because companies 
that will enter in those financial operations experience an increase in working capital 
registering, therefore, higher accruals. 
Moreover, since the way we calculate returns affects the results that we achieve, we 
recommend researchers to recur to several methods to deal with this problem (namely, 
cumulative returns (    ) vs. buy-hold returns (     )) to have a clearer perspective of 
the phenomenon under study. Mitchell and Stafford (2000), as well as Fama (1998), prefer 
CAR’s over BHAR’s.  
Lastly, we also advise further investigators, when controlling outliers, to substitute the 
“TRIMMEAN” by the Least Trimmed Squares (LTS), a procedure used by Knez and 
Ready (1997) and replicated by Kraft (2006). They defend that this procedure excludes the 
observations that most of the times are not recognized as outliers by the majority of 
investors. 
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Given the amount of research on the accrual anomaly and the complexity associated to 
some improvements, it was not possible for us to adjust for all the situations described 
before. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
7. References 
 
Alford, A. W. et al. (1994), “Extensions and Violations of the Statutory SEC Form 10-K 
Filing Requirements”, Journal of Accounting & Economics, Vol. 17(1-2), pp. 229-
254.  
Allen, E. J. et al. (2013), “Accrual reversals, earnings and stock returns”, Journal of 
Accounting & Economics, Vol. 56(1), pp. 113-129.  
Baber, W. R. et al. (2006), "Stock price reaction to evidence of earnings management: 
Implications for supplementary financial disclosure", Review of Accounting Studies, 
Vol. 11(1), pp. 5-19. 
Ball, R. and P. Brown (1968), “An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Numbers”, 
Journal of Accounting Research, pp. 159-178. 
Ball, R. et al. (2000), “The effect of international institutional factors on properties of 
accounting earnings”, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 29, pp. 1–51. 
Ball, R., A. Robin and J. S. Wu (2003), “Incentives versus standards: properties of 
accounting income in four East Asian countries”, Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, Vol. 36, pp. 235–270. 
Balsam, S. et al. (2002), "Accruals management, investor sophistication, and equity 
valuation: Evidence from 10-Q filings", Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 40(4), 
pp. 987-1012. 
Barth, M. E. and A. P. Hutton (2004), "Analyst earnings forecast revisions and the pricing 
of accruals", Review of Accounting Studies, Vol. 9(1), pp. 59-96. 
Beneish, M. and M. Vargus (2002), "Insider trading, earnings quality, and accrual 
mispricing", Accounting Review, Vol. 77(4), pp. 755-791. 
Bernard, V. and J. Thomas (1989, 1990), “Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift: Delayed 
Price Response or Risk Premium?, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 27, 
Current Studies on the Information Content of Accounting Earnings, pp. 1-36. 
Bernstein, L. (1993), Financial Statement Analysis, 5
th
 Edition, Homewood, IL:Irwin.  
Bradshaw, M. T. et al. (2001), "Do analysts and auditors use information in accruals?" 
Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 39(1), pp. 45-74. 
Chan, K. et al. (2006), “Earnings Quality and Stock Returns”, The Journal of Business, 
Vol. 79, pp. 1041-1082. 
42 
 
Collins, D. and P. Hribar (2000), "Earnings-based and accrual-based market anomalies: 
one effect or two?", Journal of Accounting & Economics, Vol. 29(1), pp. 101-123. 
Collins, D. W., et al. (2003), "Investor sophistication and the mispricing of accruals", 
Review of Accounting Studies, Vol. 8(2-3), pp. 251-276. 
Dechow, P. M et al.  (2011a), “Predicting Material Accounting Misstatements”, 
Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 28(1), pp. 17-82.  
Dechow, P. M.  and W. Ge (2006), "The persistence of earnings and cash flows and the 
role of special items: Implications for the accrual anomaly.", Review of Accounting 
Studies, Vol. 11(2-3), pp. 253-296. 
Dechow, P. M. (1994), "Accounting earnings and cash flows as measures of firm 
performance: The role of accounting accruals", Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, Vol. 18(1), pp. 3-42. 
Dechow, P. M. and I. D. Dichev (2002), "The quality of accruals and earnings: The role of 
accrual estimation errors.", Accounting Review, Vol. 77, pp 35-59. 
Dechow, P. M., et al. (1995), "Detecting Earnings Management", Accounting Review, Vol. 
70(2), pp. 193-225. 
Dechow, P. M. et al. (2011b), “The Accrual Anomaly”, Working Paper, University of 
California, Berkeley. 
Desai, H. M., et al. (2004), "Value-glamour and accruals mispricing: One anomaly or 
two?", Accounting Review, Vol. 79(2), pp. 355-385. 
Fairfield, P. M. et al. (2003), "Accrued earnings and growth: Implications for future 
profitability and market mispricing.", Accounting Review, Vol. 78(1), pp. 353-371. 
Francis, J. et al. (2005), "The market pricing of accruals quality", Journal of Accounting & 
Economics, Vol. 39(2), pp. 295-327. 
Freeman, R., et al. (1982), “Book rate-of-return and predictions of earnings changes: an 
empirical investigation”, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 20, No 2, pp. 639 – 
653. 
Goncharov, I. et al. (2013), “Asymmetric trading by insiders comparing abnormal returns 
and earnings prediction in Spain and Australia”, Accounting and Finance, Vol. 
53(1), pp. 163-184.  
Healy, P. (1985), “The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions”, Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, Vol. 7, pp. 85-107. 
43 
 
Hirshleifer, D. et al. (2004), “Do investors overvalue firms with bloated balance sheets?”, 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, Vol. 38, pp. 297–331. 
Hribar, P. and D. W. Collins (2002), "Errors in estimating accruals: Implications for 
empirical research", Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 40(1), pp. 105-134. 
Jones, J. (1991), “Earnings Management During Import Relief Investigations”, Journal of 
Accounting Research, Vol. 29, pp. 193-228.  
Kang, Q. et al. (2006), “Predicting stock market returns with aggregate (discretionary) 
accruals”, EFA 2006 Zurich Meetings Paper. 
Khan, M. (2005), "Are Accruals Really Mispriced? Evidence from Tests of an 
Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model", Toronto. 
Knez, P. J. and M. J. Ready (1997), “On The Robustness of Size and Book-to-Market in 
Cross-Sectional Regressions”, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 52, pp. 1355–1382. 
Kothari, S. (2001), “Capital markets research in accounting”, Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, Vol. 31, pp. 105–231. 
Kraft, A. et al. (2006), "An analysis of the theories and explanations offered for the 
mispricing of accruals and accrual components", Journal of Accounting Research, 
Vol. 44(2), pp. 297-339. 
Kraft, A. et al. (2007), “Regression-Based Tests of the Market Pricing of Accounting 
Numbers: The Mishkin Test and Ordinary Least Squares”, Journal of Accounting 
Research, Vol. 45 (5), pp. 1081-1114. 
LaFond, R. (2005), “Is the Accrual Anomaly a Global Anomaly?”, MIT Sloan Research 
Paper No. 4555-05.  
Leippold, M. and H. Lohre (2010), “Data Snooping and the Global Accrual Anomaly”, 
EFA 2007 Ljubljana Meetings Paper. 
Leuz, C. et al. (2002), “Earnings Management and Investor Protection: An International 
Comparison”, Journal of Financial Economics Vol. 69, pp. 505-527. 
Mishkin, F. (1983), “A Rational Expectations Approach to Macroeconometrics: Testing 
Policy Effectiveness and Efficient-markets Models”, Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Papanastasopoulos, G. (2013), “Accounting Accruals and Stock Returns: Evidence from 
European Equity Markets”, European Accounting Review, Vol. 23, pp. 729-768. 
Pincus, M. et al. (2007), "The accrual anomaly: International evidence.", Accounting 
44 
 
Review, Vol. 82(1), pp. 169-203. 
Pope, P. (2001), “Discussion of The Relation Between Incremental Subsidiary Earnings 
and Future Stock Returns in Japan”, Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 
Vol. 28(9-10), pp. 1141-1148. 
Richardson, S. A. et al. (2005), "Accrual reliability, earnings persistence and stock prices", 
Journal of Accounting & Economics, Vol. 39(3), pp. 437-485. 
Richardson, S. et al. (2005), 'Accrual reliability, earnings persistence and stock prices', 
Journal of Accounting & Economics, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 437-485. 
Richardson, S. et al. (2006), “The Implications of Accounting Distortions and Growth for 
Accruals and Profitability”, The Accounting Review, Vol. 81, No. 3, pp. 713-743. 
Soares, N. and A. Stark (2011), “Is there an Accruals or Cashflow Anomaly in UK Stock 
Returns?”, CEFUP, pp. 1-37.  
Schwert, G. (2003), Anomalies and Market Efficiency, Handbook of the Economics of 
Finance, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science B.V. 
Shon, J. J. and P. Zhou (2005), "Does the accruals anomaly result from the market's 
mispricing of growth in net operating assets?", American Accounting Association 
Conference. 
Sloan, R. G. (1996), "Do Stock Prices Fully Reflect Information in Accruals and Cash 
Flows about Future Earnings?", The Accounting Review, Vol. 71(3), pp. 289-315. 
Thomas, J. and H. Zhang (2002), “Inventory Changes and Future Returns”, Review of 
Accounting Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 163-187. 
Vale, Ivo (2013), “The Accruals Anomaly: Evidência do Caso Português”, Master 
Dissertation, FEP, University of Porto. 
Wu, J. et al. (2007), “Understanding the Accrual Anomaly”, Working Paper No. 13525, 
Cambridge University. 
Xie, H. (2001), "The mispricing of abnormal accruals", Accounting Review, Vol. 76(3), pp. 
357-373. 
Zach, T. (2003), “Inside the Accrual Anomaly”, Olin School of Business, Washington 
University in St. Louis. 
Zhang, X. F. (2007), “Accruals, investment, and the accrual anomaly”, Accounting Review, 
Vol. 82(5), pp. 1333-1363.  
 
45 
 
8. Annexes 
 
A. Variables 
The variables used in our study are described in the table below. 
 
Variable Code Datastream Description       
Cash (WC02003) 
Represents money available for use in the normal 
operations of the company. It is the most liquid of all of 
the company's assets. 
Current 
Assets 
(Total) 
(WC02201) 
Represents cash and other assets that are reasonably 
expected to be realized in cash, sold or consumed within 
one year or one operating cycle. Generally, it is the sum 
of cash and equivalents, receivables, inventories, prepaid 
expenses and other current assets. For non-U.S. 
corporations, long term receivables are excluded from 
current assets even though included in net receivables. 
Current 
Liabilities 
(Total) 
(WC03101) Represent debt or other obligations that the company 
expects to satisfy within one year. 
Earnings 
Before 
Interest and 
Taxes 
(WC18191)  
Represent the earnings of a company before interest 
expense and income taxes. It is calculated by taking the 
pre-tax income and adding back interest expense on debt 
and subtracting interest capitalized. 
Long Term 
Debt 
(WC03251) 
Represents all interest bearing financial obligations, 
excluding amounts due within one year. It is shown net 
of premium or discount. 
Income 
Taxes 
Payable 
(WC03063) Represents an accrued tax liability which is due within 
the normal operating cycle of the company. 
Market Value 
For Company 
(MVC) 
MVC is the consolidated market value of a company 
displayed in millions of units of local currency. MVC is 
the same value as MV for companies with a single listed 
equity security. However, for companies with more than 
one listed or unlisted equity security MVC represents: 
EQUITY A(MV) + EQUITY B(MV) + EQUITY C(MV) 
etc . 
Net 
Receivables 
(WC02051) 
Represent the amounts due to the company resulting 
from the sale of goods and services on credit to 
customers (after applicable reserves). These assets 
should reasonably be expected to be collected within a 
year or within the normal operating cycle of a business. 
Price (P) 
The ‘current’ price on Datastream’s equity programs is 
the latest price available to us from the appropriate 
market in primary units of currency (except in the case of 
the UK where price is given in pence). It is the previous 
day’s closing price from the default exchange except 
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where more recent or real-time prices are available. The 
‘current’ prices taken at the close of market are stored 
each day. These stored prices are adjusted for subsequent 
capital actions, and this adjusted figure then becomes the 
default price offered on all Research programs. The 
actual historical prices can be accessed using the 
unadjusted price datatype (UP). Prices are generally 
based on ‘last trade’ or an official price fixing. For stocks 
which are listed on more than one exchange within a 
country, default prices are taken from the primary 
exchange of that country (note that this is not necessarily 
the ‘home’ exchange of the stock). For Japan and 
Germany , prices from the secondary markets can be 
obtained by qualifying the price datatype with an 
exchange code (see below for details).  
Property, 
Plant and 
Equipment 
(WC02301) 
 represents tangible assets with an expected useful life of 
over one year which are expected to be used to produce 
goods for sale or for distribution of services. 
Revenues 
(WC01001) 
Represent gross sales and other operating revenue less 
discounts, returns and allowances.  
Total Assets (WC02999) 
Represent the sum of total current assets, long term 
receivables, investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries, 
other investments, net property plant and equipment and 
other assets. 
Total Debt (WC03255) Represents all interest bearing and capitalized lease 
obligations. It is the sum of long and short term debt. 
Note: WC stands for Worldscope. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
